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Abstract
This article utilizes a three-pronged analytical model to examine the mechanics of British colonialism and its
socioeconomic and political consequences in India. Those three elements are divide and rule, colonial
education, and British laws. The British took some reformative initiatives that ostensibly deserve appreciation
such as the development of a predictable legal system, investment in infrastructure development, and
education in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. However, most colonial policies and reforms
were against the will and welfare of the people of India. The British took away India’s resources and introduced
the English educational system to create an educated and elite buffer class for its own interests. It also
introduced positivistic and predictable laws and repressive and discriminatory measures, including force, to
control the natives and prevent anti-British agitation, protests, and armed uprisings in India. Although the
consequences of British colonialism in India has been explored from various disciplines, the legacy of British
colonialism to present day Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan has not been examined from the Peace and
Conflict Studies (PACS) lens. Johan Galtung’s (1990) violence triangle framework helps us to understand the
different forms of colonial violence, and the need for positive peacebuilding in the post-colonial context. This
paper argues that the current educational policy, the legal framework, and the ethno-religious-cultural
diversity of today, exhibiting the structural, cultural, and direct violence, are a continuation of the legacy of the
British Raj.
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India became a Crown colony in 1876, yet the origins of British colonialism can be traced 
back to 1757 when the British navy and merchants first arrived in India (Lyer, 2010). During the 
1760s, the British acquired India from Mughal emperor (Baber, 1996, p. 110).  The demise of the 
Mughal empire and the consolidation of British colonial power resulted from the intersection of 
internal and external, historical, conjectural, and structural factors (Baber, 1996; Condos, 2016; 
DeSousa, 2008).  
Colonialism refers to “the conquest and control of other people’s lands and goods” 
(Loomba, 1998, p. 2), the forceful seizure of local land and economy, and the reshuffling of non-
capitalist economies to speed up European capitalism (Loomba, 1998, p. 20). Mercantilism and 
political and military control were the driving forces behind the British colonial expansion in the 
Indian subcontinent (Lloyd, 2008). Britain employed the military in territorial colonialism in 
India while it used maritime commercial colonialism in North America (Lloyd, 2008). According 
to Lloyd (2008), “The depth of the penetration of British culture varies widely from Ireland or 
the Caribbean through India to the virtual apartheid regimes of British Africa” (Lloyd, 2008, p. 
390). With India’s defeat on June 23, 1757, in the Battle of Plassey, the Indian subcontinent 
remained colonized under the British Empire for the next two hundred years (Lyer, 2010). 
The British took two-thirds of the sub-continent under direct administration and achieved 
their economic and political objectives (DeSousa, 2008). In 1664, the British East India 
Company (EIC) competed with the French Compagnie des Indes Orientales and tackled the 
escalation of factional conflicts, wars of succession, and rivalries among the regional Indian 
powers (Baber, 1996, p. 119). The British took full control of Bengal after the 1757 Battle of 
Plassey and the 1764 Battle of Buxar, collecting revenues, and establishing its colonial 
domination in India (Baber, 1996, p. 123; Chatterjee, 1993, p. 284). After the 1857 mutiny, the 
British Crown established direct rule—giving up the policy of annexation, as a token of 
recognition to curry favour with some native states during the mutiny. However, the colonial 
administration maintained its right to intervene in the internal affairs of those native states whose 
rulers were considered to be treacherous to the crown (Lyer, 2010). Under the treaties of 
accession, these native states joined Pakistan or India in 1948, and followed the same legal, 
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administrative, and political systems as the colonial power. However, as history shows, the 
aftermath of accession is still felt to this day in the case of Balochistan and Kashmir. 
With the 1784 India Act, Britain established direct involvement in India, initially through 
bringing EICs activities under the British Parliament’s direct supervision. The 1813 Charter 
implemented full colonial administration and separate territorial and commercial jurisdictions for 
the EIC (Baber, 1996; Chaudhary, 2009). In the meantime, the EIC appointed the British 
ambassador, established permanent factories, and entrenched British settlements in India. 
Britain’s colonial governments controlled 680 “princely states” or “native states” through 
hereditary local kings that constituted about 45 percent of the total area of British India 
(excluding Myanmar and Sindh) (Lyer, 2010, p. 610), with 23 percent of the total population 
(Lyer, 2010, p. 694). By co-ordinating its economic and political objectives, Britain ruled 
India—one of the largest colonies in terms of land and population (Stokes, 1973).  
The British codified laws in India in terms of the rationalization of law in the Weberian 
sense to ensure “order,” “certainty,” and “uniformity” (DeSousa, 2008, p. 68), as well as 
Bentham’s liberal ideas of the rule of law and equality principles (Kolsky, 2010). These laws, 
while giving a sense of uniformity to the rule of law, were also used against the local populace to 
suppress uprisings. The British abolished the Mughal Court and removed three-quarters of the 
warlord aristocracy. They eliminated many local feudal landowners and established a British-
styled bureaucracy whose new aristocrats tended to follow a British life style. The British 
introduced the English language, its underlying culture, literature, and philosophy to strengthen 
its power base, as well as an elite class who were biologically Indians but culturally English.  
This article discusses British colonialism in India with a specific focus on three 
interlocking areas: governance, education, and the law, as well as the legacy of British 
colonialism in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, by applying Johan Galtung’s (1990) violence 
triangle framework. In each section, some cases or examples are used. The elements of the 
British colonial model applied by Britain to its former colonies include control over land, divide 
and rule, apartheid laws, ethnocentrism, education and language, religious suppression, native 
inferiority, depoliticization, and trauma and inward violence (Byrne, Clarke, & Rahman, 2018; 
Rahman, Clarke, & Byrne, 2017). From the common elements of the British colonial model, this 
article, however, focuses on three elements: divide and rule, colonial education, and draconian 
law, since they are applicable to the colonization of the Indian subcontinent.  
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Violence, conflict, and peace are explored extensively by Galtung (1964, 1990, 1996). 
Each of these interlocking terms is conceptualized as a triangle that has been less explored in a 
postcolonial peacebuilding context. According to Galtung (1969, p. 168), “…violence is present 
when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are 
below their potential realizations” (p. 168). Violence is “the cause of the difference between the 
potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is” (p. 168). Violence can take 
three forms: a) direct (physical violence that includes murder, assault, rape, torture, hate crimes, 
ethnic violence); b) structural (that results from the uneven distribution of resources caused by 
the structural mechanisms—social, political, and economic); and c) cultural (that includes 
religion, language, symbols, ideology, etc.) (Byrne & Senehi, 2012, pp. 34–36; Reimer, Schmitz, 
Janke, & Matyok, 2015, p. 24). Structural, cultural, and direct violence are intricately interrelated 
so that one form leads to another and vice versa (Byrne & Senehi, 2012, p. 3). Direct violence 
may be utilized to generate and perpetuate structural violence (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). 
Cultural violence can be used to maintain and legitimize direct and structural violence (Galtung, 
1990).  
Conflicts are mostly viewed from the lens of direct violence, overlooking indirect and 
invisible (structural and cultural) violence (Galtung, 1964). According to Galtung (1996), 
conflict is a triadic construct in terms of equally important aspects: attitudes (A), behaviours (B), 
and contradictions (C) (p. 71, 72). “The basic contradiction/content of the conflict lies in the 
verticality of the structure, the repression (of freedom) in the political case and exploitation (of 
well-being) in the economic case” (Galtung, 1996, p. 93).  
Galtung’s (1969) notion of peace has two sides: negative and positive (pp. 167, 183). He 
notes that “peace” is “absence of violence” (pp. 168, 183). The absence of personal or direct 
violence is negative peace, and the absence of structural violence or social injustice is positive 
peace or social justice (pp. 172, 183). Peace means the social goals agreed by many, if not most 
citizens, and that peace is attainable (p. 167). Consequently, as Byrne, Clarke, and Rahman 
(2018) state, “inclusive and just societies must explore their past and address the legacy of 
colonialism that continues to fuel and drive conflict” (p. 14). It is argued in this paper that the 
British sustained their colonial presence in India through the application of divide and rule 
policy, colonial education, and discriminatory laws promoting direct, structural, and cultural  
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violence, as conceptualized by Galtung (1969, 1990). This paper further argues that this British 
colonial legacy impacting ethno-racial and religious minorities requires positive peacebuilding in 
the post-colonial context. 
Divide and Rule 
The British used the strategy of “divide and rule” to provoke hostility between Hindus 
and Muslims. The divide and rule policy used religion to drive a wedge between Indians which 
eventually resulted in the death and displacement of millions of people, as well as the destruction 
of key economic assets (Lyer, 2010; Tharoor, 2017).  
The British realized that India was a land of sociocultural diversity, and to exploit and 
control the lands, it was imperative to incite Hindus against Muslims and the masses against the 
princes, as well as provoking one caste against the other to augment caste divisions and class 
disparity among the Hindu community. For example, the British denied the legitimacy of the 
Muslim Sultan Tipu’s rule and used propaganda to violate the Hindu constitution around landed 
property (Baber, 1996, p. 127). 
In the years following Britain’s victory in the Battle of Plassey, the British initiated 
policies that undermined India’s national cohesion and provoked communal division (Tharoor, 
2017). In the 1857 mutiny, Hindu and Muslim soldiers were unified around loyalty to the 
Mughal prince, which worried the British rulers who devised policies and programs to fracture 
relationships between Muslims and Hindus. For example, the British ousted Muslims from 
power and they naturally were hostile to the British who favored Hindus, which further alienated 
Muslims. The colonizer’s policies were intended to purge Muslims from India’s sociopolitical 
landscape since they strongly protested and challenged British imperial rules. The divide and rule 
policy can also be traced to the English education policy that included Hindus while excluding 
Muslims. As a result, Muslims lagged behind, and the British took no steps to bring Muslims 
into economic parity. 
This divide and rule strategy also surfaced in appeasing the Muslim community when the 
colonizer became wary of Congress’ popularity, because of the latter’s highly nationalistic 
undertones. The British knew it was critical that they develop a good relationship with Muslims 
if the influence of the Indian National Congress was to be countered. Hence, the British reached 
out to Syed Ahmed Khan, who was later knighted and who believed that co-operation with the 
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British would benefit Muslims more than forging an alliance with Hindus in national agitation 
(Lewis, 1962). Britain’s anti-Muslim attitudes waned in favour of initiating anti-Hindu policies.   
Another example of the policy of divide and rule was the 1905 partition of Bengal which 
sought to suppress the spirit of the progressive intellectuals of Bengal (Asiatic Society of 
Bangladesh, 2003). The partition was an astute project intended to drive a wedge between 
Hindus and Muslims and stifle their national movement (Lewis, 1962). The British rulers tried to 
destroy Bengal’s integration through its partition by separating the largely Muslim eastern areas 
from the largely Hindu western areas to undermine people’s unity. The British objective was to 
rule and exploit people, but Lord Curzon viewed it as a policy to promote his administrative 
efficiency (Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003).  
The scars of the divide and rule policy are still evident in modern day India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh. The Hindu-Muslim hostility, spawned by the divide and rule policy, is still 
prevalent in these countries. The antagonism often takes a serious form that contributes to 
marginalizing Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh. As such, Hindus and 
Muslims view each other with suspicion and feel discomfort in co-existing as they did for years 
before the advent of the British. Hindus do not feel safe and secure in Bangladesh, so they 
migrate to India. As a result, the Hindu population is declining in the country. According to the 
1951 census report, Hindus were 22 percent of the population in Bangladesh; by 1974, this figure 
declined to 14 percent, and the last 2011 census records only 8.4 percent Hindus living in 
Bangladesh (Trivedi, 2016). This gradual declining figure suggests that Hindus migrate to India 
for a safer and better life. Hindus also leave Pakistan for India because of a lack of security, 
among other things. Like Hindus of Bangladesh and Pakistan, Muslims as a minority group are 
often persecuted and victimized in India. In recent years, Muslims have often been harassed and 
tortured and sometimes even lynched by radical Hindus on the suspicion of indulging in selling 
or buying beef (Chatterji & Babu, 2017; Suri, 2015). However, while the legacy of British 
colonialism in the form of divide and rule still exists, to hold the British solely responsible for 
present day affairs in the Indian sub-continent would be unfair. Politicians in India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh have used religion to fan the flames of hostility and to garner votes, a policy which 
has had disastrous consequences for the region.  
The legacy of British colonialism continues implanting divide and rule policies against 
ethnic and religious minorities in post-colonial India today. In Bangladesh, ethnic violence in the 
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Chittagong Hill-Tracts (CHTs) can now be briefly explored to demonstrate postcolonial violence 
in Galtung’s terms. The CHT has been the home of over eleven Indigenous communities who 
have been living there from at least the fifteenth century onwards (Adnan, 2004; Chakma, 2010; 
Levene, 1999; Schendel, 1992; Schendel, Mey, & Dewan, 2000) The tribalism policy of the 
British colonizers divided the people of the CHT into tribal/hill people (paharis) and the 
Bengalis, to ensure political control (divide and rule policy) and for economic exploitation of 
environmental resources, such as forests. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi governments have 
inherited a similar colonial mindset by continuation of land-grabbing, displacement, and imposed 
dominant education and language on CHT Indigenous communities (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011; 
Chakma, 2010; IWGIA, 2012; Rahman, 2015, 2017; Schendel et al., 2000). The hilly Jumma 
(Indigenous) nation has experienced rape, arson, assault, kidnapping, and hate violence, as well 
as military violence (Adnan, 2004; Chakma, 2010; Rahman, 2015). This is direct violence by 
Bengali settlers and the state against the Indigenous people. Many view the communal riots, 
rape, murder, and arson attacks as a mechanism for pressuring Indigenous families and 
communities to leave their traditional land (Chakma, 2010). Postcolonial economic and 
development policies, such as the Kapati Electric Dam, the massive demographic and Bengali 
resettlement scheme, illegal or forceful land-grabbing, forced displacement for infrastructure 
projects, and the imposition of dominant education and language on CHT Indigenous Peoples, 
affect their land rights, traditional practices, and cultures across indigenous communities in the 
CHT (Chowdhury, 2008, 2014; R. Datta, 2015; IWGIA, 2012; Partha, 2016; Rahman, 2015, 
2017). These political and economic measures and structures create and perpetuate structural and 
cultural violence among the CHT peoples. Postcolonial nation-building and assimilation policies 
have not addressed their needs and welfare including the recognition of the cultural rights and 
identity needs of the Jumma nation (Adnan, 2004; Chakma, 2010; R. C. Roy, 2000). The Bengali 
settlers have changed the original Indigenous names of localities/settlements and disturbed the 
Jumma people’s celebration of religious and cultural festivals/rituals as a result of the 
resettlement schemes (Partha, 2016; Schendel et al., 2000). These are examples of structural and 
cultural violence that led the CHT peoples to resort to armed insurgency.  
The Government’s 1997 peace treaty with the CHT peoples appears to be cosmetic as it 
has failed to make any significant progress in resolving the land disputes, their rights to self-
recognition and cultural identity as adibhasi (Indigenous people). (Bashar, 2011; Dowlah, 2013; 
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P. Roy, 2016; The Daily Star, 2016). For example, after almost two decades of the peace accord, 
only 26 out of 72 clauses are implemented; the government has not made necessary laws to 
effect the rest of the clauses (P. Roy, 2016). The invisible and enduring structural and cultural 
violence has been continued through the Bengali resettlement politics, the non-withdrawal of 
security forces, and the establishment of infrastructures for economic, religious, and political 
purposes in the CHT (IWGIA, 2012; Larma, 2016; Rahman, 2015, 2017). 
Colonial Education in India 
Education in a country is closely related to its culture, as it provides “intergenerational 
knowledge transfer” (McGregor, 2010, p. 9). Prior to the British arrival, India’s education system 
was small in scale but well organized with Muslim children being schooled in madrasas and 
maktabs, and Hindu children being taught in pathshalas and tols. These institutions taught 
children Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, theology, grammar, logic, law, mathematics, metaphysics, 
medicine, and astrology (Chopra, Puri, & Das, 2003; Nurullah & Naik, 1943). The British 
government, however, ignored this faith-based education system and replaced it with a British 
system—an action that affirms a colonial motive the British government intended to fulfill by 
introducing English education into India.    
Initially, however, the British showed no interest in education and religious affairs of 
India (Chopra et al., 2003). The British believed that any interference in Indian education and 
religious matters might endanger its political and commercial enterprise (K. K. Datta, 1975), and 
in order to ensure its domination and control of India and to keep Hindus and Muslims quiescent, 
the British founded madrasas and colleges to provide an oriental education within the relevant 
cultural framework of the country. The founding of Alia Madrasa in 1780 by Warren Hastings 
(Governor-General from 1772 to 1785), and Sanskrit College in 1823 by Lord Amherst 
(Governor-General from 1823 to 1828) are two such examples. To advance oriental studies, 
Governor-General Lord Wellesley founded Lord Fort William College in 1800 so that English 
officials could learn local languages (Chopra et al., 2003). 
British Liberals and Evangelicals, however, demanded the introduction of British 
education with English as the medium of instruction. The British formed a Committee of Public 
Instruction, which was composed of two opposing groups, namely the Anglicists and 
Orientalists. The Anglicists argued in favor of British education by denigrating indigenous 
education, while the Orientalists argued in favor of indigenous education. Thomas Babington 
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Macaulay—an influential member of the Governor-General’s Council—recommended 
introducing English education and the following comment made by Macaulay (1965) indicates 
the colonial enterprise of Britain: 
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and 
the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English 
in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class, we may leave it to refine the 
vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed 
from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees’ fit vehicles for 
conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. (Macaulay, 1965, p. 116) 
Based on Macaulay’s recommendation, Lord William Bentinck (Governor-General from 
1833 to 1835) introduced British education in India on March 7, 1835, and devised a filtration 
model of education, according to which English education was first imparted to the upper classes 
from whom it would then filter down to the masses (Chopra et al., 2003). Sir Charles Wood, the 
President of the Board of Council, who drafted a report that provided for a comprehensive 
education system, followed Macaulay. The report recommended that English should be the 
medium of instruction for higher education, and local vernaculars remain the medium of 
instruction in schools. The report also recommended the founding of universities in Kolkata, 
Bombay, and Madras as teachers’ training colleges, and grade schools—elementary schools, 
middle schools, and high schools. To implement the recommendations, universities were 
founded in Kolkata, Bombay, and Madras, and English was introduced as a medium of 
instruction in the Indian sub-continent’s higher education system. 
Introducing a British-styled curriculum did not impact the lives of most Indians as the 
new system failed to bring about qualitative changes in the educational system, since the 
curriculum in this English model pushed learners into rote memorization (Whitehead, 2005). The 
same was also true for madrasaa and pathsalas which did not encourage students to question and 
share their views. Moreover, English education was not universal as it was designed only for the 
Indian and British elites, and individuals from humbler backgrounds did not come under the 
purview of this education project. People who received English education viewed themselves as 
superior as compared to those who were not educated under this system, and as such, the 
education system divided people into two classes: a class which received a British education and 
a class which was deprived of that education. Consequently, this education system encouraged 
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class distinction and engendered antagonism among India’s natives, thus weakening cohesion 
and contributing toward fulfilling the British vision of domination and exploitation. The 
introduction of English education in India was a key component of Britain’s divide and rule 
policy for engendering hostility and creating divisions among the natives.  
The English education system introduced by the British lacked uniformity and 
homogeneity, which left far reaching effects. For example, the British rulers introduced an 
English educational system in India, but they did not abolish the traditional madrasa educational 
system—resulting in the creation of a dual education system. The sustainment of a dual 
education system continues to engender unrest and tension in educational institutions to this day. 
For instance, the students studying in mainstream educational institutions view themselves to be 
better than those studying in madrasas. On the other hand, the students of madrasas claim that 
they have better knowledge about theology and logic than those studying in mainstream 
institutions. Thus, students of both streams treat each other with suspicion, hostility, and 
antagonism. Records indicate that madrasa students are more hostile and are more vulnerable to 
violent radicalization. While madrasas have existed for centuries, many argue that these 
seminaries are breeding grounds for militancy and radicalization (Rahman, 2016b; Rahman & 
Kashem, 2011; Riaz, 2008a, 2008b).   The study of Ahmed (2009) shows that the madrasa 
students, indoctrinated with jihadi ideology during Zia-ul-Haq’s time, were sent to Afghanistan 
to fight against Soviet occupiers. The study also reveals that the University of Nebraska-Omaha 
developed and designed textbooks to inspire and justify the “holy war” against the Soviets. 
Radicalization of madrasa students is, therefore, manufactured and manipulated.  
Radicalization and extremism among youths with non-mainstream education are complex 
and multidimensional, and the underlying issues of, risk factors for, and pathways to, violent 
extremism among youths in Bangladesh need empirical research (Rahman, 2016a, 2018b; Riaz 
& Bastian, 2011). The radicalization of madrasa students came to the attention of law-
enforcement and scholars during 2005-2006 (Rahman, 2016b; Riaz, 2008b), and the students 
with private university and English medium schools have been found radicalized afterwards 
(Rahman, 2016b, 2018b; Riaz, 2016).  Students of non-mainstream schools (madrasas and 
private university/English medium schools) fall victim to radicalization (Rahman, 2016b, 2018b, 
Riaz, 2008b, 2016). The existing discourses suggest that madrasa students with poor economic 
background are more likely to be easily radicalized (BEI, 2011; Rahman, 2016b; Rahman & 
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Kashem, 2011; Riaz, 2008b, 2016). On the other hand, private university and/or English medium 
students from economically solvent families keep themselves aloof from traditional social life, 
and are more engaged in internet and social media that can easily recruit and purchase them for 
terrorist activities. Moreover, it should also be noted that graduates with mainstream education 
background (Bengali) are rarely radicalized and involved in terrorist activities (Rahman, 2016b; 
Riaz, 2008b). This different trend stems from mainstream education based on indigenous cultural 
values as compared to the non-mainstream education system that impedes students from being 
apart of society. Division and discrimination in education systems contribute to generating 
radicalism and extremism (Rahman & Kashem, 2011; Riaz, 2008b).  
To further note, most employers prefer general (Bengali medium) and English medium 
students to madrasa students, and thus, the society sustains structural inequality. Remarkably, 
students of these two streams of institutions have a close similarity in a point: English medium 
students trained in the English education system advocate western values more than national 
values, and madrasa students trained in theology practice and plead Islamic values.  Thus, they 
keep apart from each other and cannot unify with mainstream students. These employer 
perceptions, stereotypes, and negative attitudes of the mainstream society towards madrassa 
education, indicate the persistence of structural and cultural violence against students and 
graduates with non-mainstream graduates. The student community of the former British 
colony—India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—have been experiencing this triadic division. As the 
students of the two non-mainstreams are not formally trained in national values, cultures, and 
traditions, they are less careful about nation and country—a tendency that leads them to 
radicalization and terrorism. Some key informant interviews suggest the negative attitudes of 
society toward madrasa education and the unfair treatment by employers who often decline to 
hire madrasa graduates lacking adequate skills compared to mainstream students (Rahman & 
Kashem, 2011). The profile of Islamist terrorists in Bangladesh indicates largely non-mainstream 
educational backgrounds (Rahman, 2016b; Riaz, 2016). To specify, on July 1, 2016, six youths 
attacked Holey Artisan Bakery (a bakery shop located in Dhaka), where they killed 29 innocent 
people, including 20 hostages (18 were foreigners), two police officers, and two staff (Fair & 
Abdallah, 2017, p. 3). Of the six terrorists, five were identified as private university students with 
English medium education backgrounds, and the last was schooled in a madrasa. 
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From the viewpoint of justice, Britain’s education policy in India was not only an 
instrument of domination but also a weapon of oppression meted out to Indians. This education 
system can be compared to the banking education model (Freire, 2012), where education is 
viewed as a process that deposits knowledge into students. Teachers are the supreme authority in 
this system while students’ pre-existing knowledge is ignored (Freire, 2012). “The more 
completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to 
the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them ” (Freire, 2012, p. 73). 
Similarly, the British colonizers imparted British education, science, and philosophy to Indian 
learners. This indoctrination and oppression imposed on the colonized as an “undue strain 
inflicted upon pupils” who felt difficulty in expressing their ideas in English (Sundaram, 1946, p. 
518).  
An effective education must ensure the consent and participation of learners, teachers, 
and administrators. The British ignored this issue and did not research what students wanted 
from their education. The British viewed their system of education as superior, and to make 
superior Indian citizens, they introduced the Western education system to them. This model 
manufactured skilled clerks who helped the colonizer to collect revenue. Moreover, this new 
system of education destroyed local cultures and stifled people’s political consciousness 
(DeSousa, 2008). 
From a practical point of view, the British taught the Indian elite the English language to 
get services and benefits from them. By providing British education and culture, and the English 
language to the Indian elite and the masses, the British made them produce goods for European 
markets and also consume European goods (Pennycook, 1988). British education was for profit 
for the colonizers. This kind of profit mongering is reflected in Shakespeare’s (1623) play The 
Tempest, where the colonizer Prospero confesses to Miranda that he (Prospero) must not disown 
Caliban: “We cannot miss him; he does make our fire, fetch in our wood, and serves in offices, 
that profit us…” (1.2.312-14). To explain, Caliban is one of the major characters in this play 
whose inherited island is usurped by colonizer Prospero who enslaves and uses him for his 
colonial enterprise. Like Prospero, the British colonizers made Indians Shakespeare’s Calibans 
from whom they would get profit, cheap labor, and information about the wealth of India. 
However, it can also be argued that learning the English language can be viewed from an 
empowerment perspective. The British taught Indians Western knowledge and the English 
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language, which eventually enabled them to be aware of their rights. It can be argued that, 
enriched with the power of knowledge from Western education, the Indians began to think of 
their freedom. They spoke about their independence, reclaimed their land, and finally after ninety 
years of complete British rule, they succeeded in taking back their land from the colonial 
masters.  
In British India, the colonial education policy imposed English upon the local populace, 
subjugated local languages, and even created a buffer class to serve the colonists. This language 
subjugation is an integral component of the colonial power’s structural and cultural violence as 
viewed by Galtung (1969, 1990) that still exists and affects the Indigenous communities in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh. The dominant language (Bengali) was imposed by 
the state on the Indigenous people in Bangladesh. Indigenous languages are not recognized, and 
the Indigenous people’s language rights to this day are not protected despite their demands for 
having mother tongue education and recognition in their schools (Partha, 2016; Yasmin, 2014). 
The same applies to ethnic and religious minorities in India and Pakistan, where to this day 
English is the official language in a majority of educational institutions and in the judicial system 
(Mahboob, 2017). 
The British Raj and the Law 
“The foundation of our empire in India rests on the principle of justice, and England 
retains its supremacy in India mainly by justice. Without justice we could not hold India for a 
moment” (Kolsky, 2010, p. 1). This section examines the legal system constructed by the British 
Raj to govern the Indian subcontinent. Laws used by the British to further their own interests are 
also examined and finally the impact of the “legal” colonial legacy is explored.   
To begin, the codified English law administered by the courts was initially applied only 
to Europeans residing in the sub-continent. However, by 1773 it was proposed that in matters of 
marriage, inheritance, and other individual affairs, Islamic laws should be applied to Muslims, 
and Hindu laws to Hindus (Otter, 2012). While it is not clear whether this bifurcation of the law 
was proposed to introduce the policy of divide and rule, it had long lasting impacts that 
ultimately led to the division of the sub-continent based on religion.  
During the initial 150 years of the British Raj, the colonial masters deferred to Indigenous 
and local laws for the resolution of disputes (Giunchi, 2010), even though at that stage Islamic 
law was applied to Muslims and Hindu Law to Hindus. This application of religious laws was 
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convenient for the British, since unlike some other British colonies, the Indian sub-continent 
already had codified religious decisions such as the Fatawa-e-Alamigiri (The Edicts of Emperor 
Alamgir), which could be relied upon by judges. Moreover, during this period, anything that was 
indigenous and local was romanticized, including religious texts and laws. To achieve the 
colonizer’s goals, key religious texts such as the Fatawa and the Hedaya for Muslims, and the 
Dharma Sastra for Hindus were translated into English by William Jones, Neil Baillie, and 
Nathaniel Brassy Halhead, respectively (Giunchi, 2010).  
This idealization of Indigenous Indian customs and laws was, however, short lived. For 
instance, the British philosopher James Mill considered Indigenous Indian laws to be “a 
disorderly compilation of loose, vague, stupid, or unintelligible quotations and maxims selected 
arbitrarily from book of law, book of devotion, and books of poetry; attended with a commentary 
which only adds to the absurdity and darkness; a farrago by which nothing is defined, nothing 
established” (Judd, 2004, p. 38). 
The reason for the eventual disillusionment of the British with Indigenous religious laws 
was a result of their attempts to categorize the monolithic, fluid, and diverse religious identities 
within both Hinduism and Islam. For example, Islam can be broadly divided into two major 
sects: Sunni’ism and Shi’ism. In Sunni’ism itself, there are four different schools of thought, with 
each school of thought having its own sub-school. Hence, trying to lump the diversity of 
opinions produced by these scholars into one, single, uniform code would logically entail a 
failure of the system. 
There is another way this change in attitude can, however, be looked at in a manner 
which is less judgmental of the British. Replacement of religious law with Western positivist law 
in the public sphere could have stemmed from the desire of the British to legitimize their rule 
over the sub-continent and to appear to be more accountable to the native population (Judd, 
2004). For example, the codified law would turn the colonizers into “the prisoner of their own 
rhetoric,” which presumably was meant to create a “feel good effect” amongst the colonizer 
(Kolsky, 2010, p. 72). However, detractors of the “benign” colonization argument view the sub-
continent as a laboratory for the British to experiment with their legal test-tubes before 
implementing them in Britain (Giunchi, 2010; Kolsky, 2010; Otter, 2012).  
After the failed 1857 rebellion, the 1858 British India Act was introduced, which 
transferred the power to rule from the EIC to the British Crown directly. Moreover, a Secretary 
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of State for India was established, who would be counselled by a 15-member council (Judd, 
2004). This was the first of many steps that would lead to a complete and formal control of the 
Crown over its Indian subjects. 
The eventual British disdain for all Indigenous religious laws led to a complete purge of 
religion from criminal law and a partial purge from civil law. For example, in 1860 the Indian 
sub-continent was given a new set of laws, the Indian Penal Code. Among other things, the code 
outlawed adultery, fornication, and struck down corporal punishment for women in cases of 
adultery (Giunchi, 2010); all of these provisions were part of Shariah law. In addition, the British 
continued to treat women paternalistically by using the law. Section 506 (i) of the Indian Penal 
Code provided a jail term for up to three years for:  
Whoever, (i) intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any 
sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, 
or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy 
of such woman. (The Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 506 (i))  
The provision is still part of the penal code of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan that may be seen 
as either a sign of times or as a tool to emasculate men by elevating the status of women and 
placing them on a pedestal. However, as Justice Willy Brennan once aptly pointed out, “Our 
nation had had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such 
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of romantic paternalism, which in practical effect 
put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 1973). 
The key change, in the context of the laws came in 1862 with the enactment of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. The Code prohibited Indian judges from issuing arrest warrants or 
indicting European or British individuals for crimes (Kolsky, 2010). Moreover, the code 
provided that only British born judges could try the cases of British born accused persons, and 
where the alleged crime carried the death penalty, the accused had the right to be tried by a jury, 
half of whom would consist of British-born persons (Kolsky, 2010). This was, indeed, quite the 
digression from the implementation of the “principle of justice” as was initially proclaimed by 
the British when they colonized India.  
During 1900-1947, British “illegal laws” governed the Indians. By the turn of the 
century, it became clear that the British had adopted a carrot and stick policy as a tool of 
governance. On the one hand, they created the Indian Civil Services by which they would control 
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the Indians through Indians by appointing educated locals in the bureaucracy. On the other hand, 
the British were quite ruthless when it came to legislation and crimes. For instance, the 1901 
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) contended that individuals convicted of certain crimes, such 
as homosexuality, could be whipped; the jurisdiction of civil courts was barred; a whole tribe 
could be held responsible for the acts of an individual (their properties could be seized and 
demolished) and whole villages could be found accountable collectively (Ss. 6, 10, 21, 22, 
Frontier Crime Regulations 1901). The FCR was not the only draconian law enacted by the 
colonial masters. The Indian Press Act, for example, outlawed any publications which aimed to 
“bring into hatred or contempt his Majesty or the Government established by law in British India 
or the administration of justice in British India or any Native Prince or chief under the suzerainty 
of his Majesty...” (s. 4(1)(c) The Indian Press Act, 1910). As Otter (2012) points out, curtailment 
of civil liberties did not just stop with restrictions on the press. For instance, under the Prevention 
of Seditious Meetings Act, a district magistrate was given power to prohibit any public meeting: 
“…if, in his opinion, such meeting is likely to promote sedition or disaffection or to cause a 
disturbance of the public tranquillity” (s. 5, Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911). This 
legacy of the British Raj is still present in Pakistan wherein the government has the right to 
outlaw a public gathering of more than four individuals (S.144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898) and to subject speech:  
…to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the 
integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with 
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court. 
(Article 19, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973) 
These laws are still operative even after seven decades of independence in these countries for 
political reasons or to oppress opponents/ dissidents. 
While the British were repressing free speech and expression, they were also leaning 
toward power-sharing with the locals. Under the 1908-1909 Reforms Act, commonly known as 
the Minto-Morley reforms, Indians would be elected to the legislative councils, both in the 
capital and in the provinces. While the reforms did reserve power at the center for people 
nominated by the crown, they enabled the provinces to elect natives who would be in the 
majority (James, 1997). The reforms also gave Muslims the right to a separate electorate. 
Whether this move was meant to exacerbate the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims, or 
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whether it was an effort to recognize the demand of the All India Muslim League for a separate 
electorate, remains open to interpretation. 
The watershed moment of draconian legislation leading to massive violence and the 
ultimate victory of the wretched of India can be traced back to the two Rowlatt Acts of 1918 and 
1919, respectively. After WWI, the British, keeping in line with their earlier attitude towards free 
speech and assembly, enacted laws that enabled an accused person to be arrested without a 
warrant, detained indefinitely, and not allowed to confront her/his accuser(s) (Vohra, 2002). This 
law was arguably passed to suppress Gandhi’s satyagraha movement and the Khilafat 
Movement. The recently enacted stricter laws didn’t prevent people from protesting and 
eventually on April 13, 1919, the worst attack by British law enforcement on unarmed protestors 
occurred. A group of roughly 10,000 protestors were protesting in Jallianwala Bagh, and on the 
orders of the officer commanding, General Dyer, the walls of the garden were locked and the 
British Indian Army opened fire on unarmed citizens leading to the deaths of almost 400 people 
(Judd, 2004, pp. 131–132). The Jallianwala Bagh massacre eventually resulted in weakening the 
British position in India and arguably, it led to the enactment of the 1935 Government of India 
Act, which provided that provincial powers would be devolved to the elected legislatures, and 
the provinces could function autonomously. However, London still had the final word when it 
came to federal affairs (Judd, 2004).   
The importance of the 1935 Government of India Act cannot be overemphasized. The 
1937 elections held under the new Act resulted in a sweeping victory for the Indian National 
Congress, which alarmed the Muslim League as it had presumed that even if the British left, they 
would be replaced by a Hindu tyranny (Judd, 2004, p. 149). Moreover, the Act was the de facto 
Constitution in the newly formed state of Pakistan, and even after Pakistan enacted its own 
Constitution, many features of the Government of India Act were included in it. Both Pakistan 
and India followed the Westminster model of democracy as set out in the 1935 Act, but amended 
it to suit their own interests. For instance, both newly formed nation states were highly 
centralized, and the provinces were not granted powers for many years (Otter, 2012).  
Several civil and procedural laws were enacted during the next decade so that the usual 
legal battles were over the devolution of powers in the Indian sub-continent, a tool employed by 
the British to hold onto the region. The most important of these plans was introduced in 1946 by 
the considerably weakened Raj and is known as the Cabinet Mission, headed by Sir Stafford 
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Cripps. He proposed that India would remain united in the form of an All-Indian Union that 
would be divided into three provincial governments: Bombay, Central Provinces, Madras, Orissa 
and the United Provinces predominantly populated by Hindus. The second cluster included 
Muslim majority regions such as Baluchistan, Khyber-Pukhtunkhwah, Punjab and Sindh. The 
final cluster included Bengal and Assam. While the provinces could not secede from the Union, 
they had the liberty to enact their own constitutions. The clusters along with the princely states 
could also elect a constituent assembly (James, 1997). While the Muslim League agreed to the 
plan, Nehru and the Indian National Congress rejected it, reinforcing the League’s belief that 
Hindus would never be willing to share power with Muslims. Eventually, a year later, two 
independent nation states, India and Pakistan, joined the comity of nations. 
While there is no doubt that the introduction of British positivist law changed the future 
of the Indian sub-continent, the legal legacy of the British Raj can be viewed both negatively and 
positively. On the negative side, it can be argued that by introducing Western law, the British 
destroyed the quasi-legal practices of native Indians that provided swift justice, which was 
acceptable to the local population. That system was replaced by a highly bureaucratic system that 
was mired in red tape. The counter to this argument is that those Indigenous systems/practices 
were at times unfair, especially when it came to women; the Jirga system and Wani are two such 
examples. Moreover, the laws introduced by British were flawed, yet they ultimately wrested 
power from the hands of the ruling monarchs. Furthermore, democracy on the subcontinent may 
be a flawed system, yet it was because of the Raj, and its legacy, that some 1.5 billion people can 
cast their votes to elect individuals who can represent their interests. Moreover, the banning of 
the Sati custom, the permit of widow marriage, and the passage of the 1910 Child Act that fixed 
the age of majority as 18, are some steps that deserve credit. While it can rightly be argued that 
the process of divide and rule continues to haunt the region for decades and has resulted in the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, it is also true that the “rule of law,” which is a legacy 
of the Raj, provides a modicum of security to individuals in establishing their justiciable and 
non-justiciable rights. Seen through this lens, the introduction of positivist law in the Indian 
subcontinent, whatever its intentions may have been, can be perceived as beneficial to the people 
in the long run. 
As illustrated earlier, many of the British laws are draconian and apartheid, and were 
against the will of the natives of India. The 1862 Code of Criminal Procedure separated 
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jurisdictions of judges along racial lines. The FCR, the Indian Press Act, The Prevention of 
Sedious Meetings Act, the Rowlatt Act, the Public Safety Bill, and the Trade Dispute Bill were 
used to suppress and discipline Indians by the British, and their fellow Indians by elite Indians 
(DeSousa, 2008; Kolsky, 2010). These laws and legal structures provided vast powers to the 
rulers that fueled direct violence and perpetuated structural violence against Indian natives. The 
legacy of these colonial discriminatory laws has been present in today’s criminal justice system. 
Bangladesh still inherits the penal code, criminal procedure code, police code, jail code, and 
evidence act, which were introduced by the British Raj (Khondaker, Kashem, & Rahman, 2018; 
Rahman, 2011; Rahman & Hossain, 2014; Senese & Kashem, 1997). After seventy years of 
independence, the rulers today perceive those systems to be useful tools in suppressing their own 
people, and these laws and legal structures have promoted both structural violence and direct 
violence as conceptualized by Galtung.  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has implemented a police reform 
project and facilitated the government’s use of a draft ordinance during the non-party interim 
government in 2007 (Patil, 2012; Rahman, 2018a; UNDP Bangladesh, 2018). Yet no legislation 
has been enacted because of the resistance of the political elites, as they want to use the colonial 
law to oppress dissents and govern the people with immunity and impunity (Khondaker et al., 
2018; Patil, 2012; Rahman, 2011, 2016b, 2018a; Rahman & Hossain, 2014). Finally, while the 
legacy of British colonialism under the guise of the law continues to haunt the Indian sub-
continent, ultimately the responsibility to enact new laws that cater to the needs of indigenous 
people lies with the elected representatives of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. 
Conclusion 
Prior to British colonialism, previous conquerors could not control India completely. 
(Stokes, 1973). However, within four years of the Plassey Battle, the British conquest 
unprecedentedly broke Indian social structures, basic institutions, and the self-sufficient village 
system. The consequences of the Battle of Plassey influenced the rule and the modes of the 
British cultural contact in the subcontinent. According to Stokes (1973), “The peculiar multi-
cellular character of Indian society made it both highly resistant to change in its social and 
cultural aspects and ipso facto subject to constant political change and to conquest from within-
highly resistant to change” (Stokes, 1973, p. 122). 
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In the post-colonial period (1956-1987), British areas were found to have higher levels of 
investments in agriculture and production, but lower levels of investments in schools, roads, 
canals, and health centers (Lyer, 2010). The public goods in terms of the access to schools, 
health centers, and roads was minimal in areas that experienced British direct rule because of the 
heavy taxation and extraction of resources. Poor policies were installed in areas remote to the 
colonizers. On the other hand, areas that experienced indirect rule exhibited opposite 
developments. Native rulers had longer tenure to invest in public goods provision, than British 
administrators (Lyer, 2010). The native rulers’ families played an important role in post-colonial 
politics by manipulating elections and controlling resources. 
The British used India to supply raw materials and provide a rich market for Britain. The 
Permanent Settlement Act introduced in India undermined the land ownership of the peasants. 
British colonizers forced Indian cultivators to provide goods for export to Britain and the new 
railway system, and whilst being beneficial to the local population, it also served the economic 
interests of the colonial power (Das, 2011; Tharoor, 2017). Famines were deliberately created by 
the colonizers who forced the Indigenous population to seek relief work, such as road-building, 
so that goods could be transported from factories to ports and shipped to Britain (Tharoor 2017; 
Lazzaro, 2013). 
The formulation of Anglo-Indian law toward having a unified and predictable modern 
legal system was meant to regulate economic, political, and social relations between individuals 
and groups. However, the British justified their codification of laws in India to show that they 
would guarantee the rule of law and justice, yet in reality, those laws were also used to 
discriminate between Indians and Europeans (DeSousa, 2008; Kolsky, 2005). The “Legal” 
legacy of the British Raj continues in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh today. The Police Act, the 
Evidence Act, the Penal Code, the Jail Code, and many other laws have been inherited from the 
British (Khondaker et al., 2018; Rahman, 2011; Rahman & Hossain, 2014). While the Indian 
sub-continent has been independent for seventy years, the continued existence of these laws may 
depict the utility that sub-continental rulers may find in using them to govern their populations. 
The British introduced Western education, the English language and culture, literature, 
and philosophy to strengthen their power in India. The British demonized Indians, viewing the 
natives as “incapable of understanding what was in their best interests” (DeSousa, 2008, p. 10). 
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They succeeded in creating an elite class that worked for the British and helped prolong colonial 
rule, and they provided a legacy that survives to this very day.  
Unlike other colonies such as Canada, British rule in the Indian sub-continent can be 
viewed as being somewhat beneficial to the local populace, particularly in the fields of education 
and law. Learning the English language empowered the native population, and local elites 
(zamiders/babus) were very happy about this system. The positive “side effects” of British 
colonial rule also deserve appreciation for bringing about an impressive awakening in cultural, 
social, and scientific fields in India in the late 19th and mid-20th centuries. The colonial 
measures addressing Sati, widow remarriage, infanticide, witchcraft, child marriage, polygamy, 
and dowry had some remarkable effects. Because of social movements and significant roles 
played by individuals like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, many of these superstitions and iniquitous 
practices were removed from the society.  
In India, the British colonizers faced several resistance and nationalist movements. 
Britain established institutions to justify and secure colonial rule, and used force to curb any 
challenges to its rule (Condos, 2016; DeSousa, 2008). Ultimately, these repressive measures 
empowered Gandhi’s nonviolent resistance against the British, which culminated in their 
departure in 1947, as divide and rule became divide and depart. 
Despite some positive social transformative steps, the British policy of divide and rule 
fueled and nurtured conflict in the Kashmir valley, the port city of Karachi between Mohajirs and 
other ethnicities, and the Rohingya and Bihari ethnic conflicts in Bangladesh. These conflicts are 
a legacy of British colonialism that have claimed many lives and abused the human rights of 
hundreds of thousands of innocent people in the Indian subcontinent. Given the direct, structural, 
and cultural violence of colonial policies of divide and rule, education, and laws, the post-
colonial states must not sustain the legacy of British colonial policy of forced assimilation, 
division, and subjugation by imposing the dominant language, religion, and culture against 
ethnic and religious minorities. For example, state policies in the CHT in the name of 
development, security, and environmental conservation must not create, and promote structural 
and cultural violence against the Indigenous communities. Positive peacebuilding approaches are 
imperative for addressing the ongoing religious divide and regional conflicts in Kashmir valley, 
Arakan State of Myanmar, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, by granting the 
right of self-determination to the natives of this region. 
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